turn affected by the technological change. But what is the course of that interaction over time in particular organizations?
This article focuses on computerization in an office-oriented government agency, specifically, a major system change that was implemented in 1989 and its reverberations over the succeeding 5 years. The emphasis is on describing the potential benefits and actual effects of the change on three distinct sets of people, specifically in the areas of increased knowledge, productivity, and skills. Despite the extraordinary gains, as staff termed it, of letting "the system" do the work, there were perils as well. Computerization challenged established hierarchical relations and spheres of individual control. Perhaps most essentially, it revealed the potential for objectifying much of the work process and bringing an unexpected transparency to people and processes.
Organizations, Technology, and Work
It is difficult in the contemporary world to separate work either from technology or from organizations. The sociological concern with organizations is, in many ways, at the very core of the understanding of modern society (Parsons, 1960; Weber, 1947) and thus inevitably of technological change. This concern underlies the development of industrial sociology and anthropology (Barnard, 1938; Eddy & Partridge, 1978; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) , was resurrected in the late 1970s and early 1980s in anthropology (Arensberg, 1978; Bate, 1997; Britan & Cohen, 1980; Serber, 1981; Whyte, 1978) , and has been strengthened in recent years by descriptive analyses of work both as a technical process (Orr, 1996; Shaiken, 1986 ) and as it is constructed in different companies, cultures, and nations (Gullén, 1994; Hamada & Sibley, 1994; Kunda, 1992; Wright, 1994) . Although much of the interest in organizations has involved relatively "objective" approaches, much work has examined the construction of meaning within and of organizations. Over the past two decades, such efforts have focused on the legitimation of action that is so central to public-sector organizations (Burton & Carlsen, 1979; Thompson, 1980) and on the more general construction of meaning, whether seen as an intriguing avenue for semiotics (Eco, 1976; Rossi, 1983) , as another in the "everyday" situations that challenge the analysis of the ethnomethodological construction of social reality (Bittner, 1967a (Bittner, , 1967b Cicourel, 1968; Douglas, 1970; Garfinkel, 1967; Mehan & Wood, 1975) , or as a consideration of the unique moral premises that-if unleashed in formal organizations-create a fundamental breach in the social order (Bittner, 1974; Haines, 1990; Handel, 1982) . There also has been recent revisiting of the Weberian origins of organizational understanding, particularly the way in which organizations are both instruments of rational purpose and socially constructed arenas, usually of power (Ray & Reed, 1994) .
This duality of approaches to organizations, which, as Davis (1997) succinctly points out, traces the divide between Simmel, Schutz, and Goffman on one hand and Durkheim and Weber on the other, is mirrored in the analysis of technology. Here, as well, an early emphasis on observable effects on industrializing society-an emphasis that often reified technology as an essential force subject to its own rules-has been challenged by reflections on the way technology is constructed (whether as object or idea) through social processes. Some (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987; Bijker & Law, 1992; Callon, 1986; Latour, 1993; Law, 1991) suggest that technological artifacts directly participate in collective processes. Such views may extend to a belief that machines, like human actors, attempt to reform and control those collectivities on their own terms, or may simply include a more prosaic recognition that machines are part of social settings, have their own individual histories, and thus (albeit without intent) interact with other machines and with people (Orr, 1996; Suchman, 1987) . Such actualization of technology with and through human actors is particularly tellingly evoked in studies of "big science" (Collins, 1997) .
Overly constructivist accounts, however, are sometimes faulted for drifting away from the objective consideration of the work that actually gets done. Both Barley (1996) and Orr (1996) stress that, although useful in their own right, discussions of the social construction of work do not come to terms with the actuality of the work process in which observable things are done by observable people to observable objects nested in observable settings. Orr concludes his book Talking About Machines with the statement that the service technicians' "goal is getting the job done. . . . Talking about machines, a vital element of their practice, is for the technicians simply a means to this end" (p. 161). Pfaffenberger (1992) sounds a similar note when he suggests there is often a "silence of human technological activity and its invisibility within the compass of theories that assign excessive privilege to speech and writing" (p. 504). More bluntly, Hakken (1993) , in noting the apparent current triumph of ethnomethodological approaches and postmodernism in general, suggests that "when epistemology cannot be practiced, the result is endless critique" (p. 220). More generally, Wildavsky (1991) wonders whether modernity has "killed objectivity."
My purpose here is not to suggest any need to choose between such positions and thus reraise, as Bourdieu (1990) puts it, that "most fundamental" and "most ruinous" (p. 25) of the oppositions that divide social scientists or, as Robey (1996) notes more specifically for information systems research, the "self-inflicted damage" that comes from "internecine wars between 'techies' and behaviorists, between positivists and intepretivists, between qualitative and quantitative researchers" (p. 406). Rather, the intent here is to focus on some specific aspects of a particular case of computerization and what possibilities emerge in the process of technological change, thus conjointly raising practical, normative, and theoretical issues. If it is simply recognized that machines-actual objects of technology however initially constructed-coexist with people, then the interarticulation of people and machines involves a process analogous to the communicative action that Habermas (1996) works so hard to establish for the political realm (cf. Kelly, 1994) . It is thus to approach the subject without excessive privilege given to either the machine or the person, either the organization or the work-staying in tune with more general calls for case study work on actual organizational change (Abbott, 1993; Darrah, 1994) , with a sense of technology both as objective force and as socially constructed one (Orlikowski, 1992) and with early warnings on the danger of cavalier assumptions about causality in technological change (Markus & Robey, 1988) .
The specific approach taken in this article is to focus on how such technological changes empower and how they vitiate the people who interact with these changes. Neither the practical nor the normative importance of such a focus needs much comment. As Markus and Benjamin (1996) note, the role of information systems people axiomatically is "to become more effective agents of organizational change" (p. 385), a role that can only be yet more normatively compelling in the public sector. However, on more theoretical grounds, it is important to note that-beyond the heuristic advantages of such an open-ended focus on a key social aspect of change-this approach rejects a reified notion of technology that is all too easily subject to overextension, thus becoming an easy target for antiessentialist critiques (Grint & Woolgar, 1997) . Instead, the approach here is that machine activities and capabilities are accessible to observation as to what they "are" as well as to what people say and do about them. This is change "writ small" and thus closer to the empirically accessible. This approach goes to the heart of agency by focusing on a word-empowerment-that incorporates both the "giving" of power and the "gaining" of it (Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998) . It acknowledges that this process involves all participants, including management (Wood, 1998) . The result is an emphasis not so much on what changes and what does not but on the capacities of those involved for further change, reflecting some of the immanent quality of future change to which Orlikowski (1996) alludes with her notion of "emergent change"-slow increments of "transformations . . . through a variety of logics" (p. 67).
The next section of the article provides an overview of the organization in question and my own involvement with it. The discussion then turns to the basic nature of the technological changes, illustrating them with an example of file management and control: one of the most fundamental and production-oriented areas of this organization (and of many others). Succeeding sections address the social consequences and correlates of the changes as the work of three distinct groups of people within the organization was alternately empowered and vitiated, especially in terms of shifts in knowledge, productivity, and skills.
APPROACH

Setting
The agency that implemented the technological changes under discussion here was a relatively small agency of state government with approximately 150 employees, most of them located in the state capital. The agency was responsible for managing disability-related claim files, of which roughly 60,000 were created each year. Much of the work involved routine processing of forms, reports, and agreements. However, the majority of the agency's staff was involved in the resolution of a much smaller number of ambiguous or disputed claims. The resolution of these cases took place on both administrative and judicial bases. The 60,000 new files each year resulted in approximately 400,000 files in active status at the agency, with more than 100,000 additional files in storage at a second location. A microfilming program reduced the active paper files by approximately 50,000 each year and had resulted in roughly 400,000 microfilmed cases by the end of the period under discussion. Nearly 350,000 pieces of incoming mail were processed each year, about 300,000 files had to be reshelved each year, and the number of outgoing letters and forms probably approached 500,000. The number of disputed cases was much smaller but still significant, with roughly 10,000 referred for some kind of judicial action each year, although about a half of those were resolved before any formal legal decision was required. The organization was a conservative one in many ways, with moderate staff turnover (despite some very low salaries) and considerable dedication of staff to the work of the organization.
In the late 1980s, the agency decided to move from a mainframe-based data system administered by a separate state agency to its own in-house client/server database system running on a newly developed local area network. The agency had also just moved toward PC-based word-processing packages to replace the earlier "dedicated" word processors, which had replaced typewriters not long before. The organization had thus moved-as have most others-from a meticulous typewriter and paper file-based system to one that stood to reap the rewards of full office automation. My own involvement with the organization began in 1989, initially as a consultant addressing issues of work organization, staffing levels, and pay as part of a larger overall study of the agency's activities. Much of my consultancy was concerned with identifying key processes that could be automated; that research included interviews with some 50 members of the organization on work processes and more general staffing and organizational issues. Subsequently, I worked with the agency as a division manager, with oversight over data processing and most of the routine production work discussed in this article. In essence, I was hired to implement the changes I had recommended. Although the process of computerization described here was only a portion of my responsibilities, it was an important one. This work ranged from general oversight, to procedural analysis of workflows, to arbitration between production staff and data-processing staff, to occasional outright system development.
That work role has implications for my account of the technological and social processes given below and for the central concern with empowerment and vitiation during periods of technological change. In terms of the former, I was in the unusual position of having direct responsibility for-and unmediated access to-the exact sequencing of major productive activities (including their redesign), the structure of the automated systems (which both reflected and increasingly constituted those productive activities), and the people doing the work. Such unmediated access is helpful in overcoming Orlikowski's (1988) early critique of much analysis of data processing as ill informed about the actual technical nature of the work. In terms of the empowerment/vitiation issue, I was strongly committed as the overall manager of both the production people and the production machines to provide concurrent technological and personnel improvements. I was determined to avoid any presumption that technology determines organizational structures, that it is in any way a substitute for human effort, that it belongs to the organizationally privileged, or that it is simply a social construction that cannot be directly grasped and used. Here, theory and practice fuse in a recognition of the specific situations in which particular technological changes do indeed permit productive changes and how such changes admit of multiple and mixed outcomes-whether or not such varied outcomes may eventually be condensed into more generalized statements about technological progress, about the reimposition of social control at all costs, or about competing discourses (either in general or as another variant of the reimposition of control but through privileged discourse). There is much in the following account that could be turned to any of such constructions, but that is not my purpose here. As with Zuboff (1988) , my practical concern was "a desire to exploit the informating capacity of the new technology, and a commitment to a fundamental change in the landscape of authority"-that duality necessary to avoid the alternate case in which "the hierarchy will use technology to reproduce itself" (p. 392). As will be seen, the press toward "informating" was less well received by this organization than was the more neutral "automating" of Zuboff's now classic distinction between those two types of technological change.
A Threefold Promise
By the late 1980s, the promise of assistance represented by technological change, in this case, PC-based, network, text, and database software, was significant. There were three distinct components to this promise of a PC-based system. The first was cost. Despite a significant initial expenditure for equipment, it was expected that mainframe-related service charges (which had risen to levels that alarmed the senior management) could be greatly reduced. However, this cost factor may have been the least significant issue. Mainframe charges were beginning to drop rapidly during this period, suggesting that an accurate cost analysis would have suggested more moderate cost savings.
The second component was freedom, on both the individual and institutional levels. The new PC-based system liberated the agency from the rigidity typical of mainframe systems and the limited responsiveness that naturally occurred when such a system was administered by a separate agency. Limited program changes, for example, could be time-consuming; massive system restructuring was essentially out of the question. As is widely noted, this kind of change to a PC-based, locally controlled dataprocessing system has a distinctly revolutionary quality.
The third component of the promise was flexibility. The new PC-based system made it possible to give extraordinary power to the end user, to link end users together (for sending messages, sharing files, and accessing data), to expand the system into new areas of the agency's work, and to link together different system components in creative ways. In this agency, it became possible to reconstruct the entire claims system and judicial data system for levels of accuracy and detail that were impossible in the prior system. Bar coding of files, automated searches of related databases, computerized file requests, flexible case look-ups, legal opinion research systems, mass production of hundreds of thousands of letters, and automatic benefit calculations were immanent in the change.
At the most basic level, the threefold promise of cost savings, freedom, and flexibility was amply fulfilled. By 1992, data processing was cheaper, more locally controlled, and more flexible and responsive to agency need. With an explosive technology that is both so powerful and so inexpensive, it would be hard to expect otherwise. But what does this explosion of promise look like once the presumed capacity of the technology was put together with the people who were to use it?
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The Benefits of Change: An Example From the File Room
For those involved in the routine processing of claims, in general requests for information, or in nonjudicial follow-up with claimants and organizations, the scope of the changes was impressive. One particular example may suffice to illustrate the extent of the changes: the management and movement of files. Prior to the changes described here, files had to be manually charged out from the file room. Written requests for files were hand delivered to file room staff, and a plastic guide was placed on the shelf to indicate where the file had gone. A considerable amount of staff time was spent roaming the halls of the organization trying to find files that had been charged out but were no longer at the original noted location. Handling of mail was a nightmarish task, because it was possible for file room staff to know only that the file had been charged out initially to some person or location but not to know with any great certainty if the file was still there.
As the lists of missing files for periodic floor searches lengthened, and the stacks of mail to be routed to missing files grew, files also backed up for other reasons. For example, files often were marked for some future action (or "diaried" as staff phrased it). The diaried files then had to be pulled from the shelves if they could be found there. When staff could not process these diaried files as quickly as needed, the files were boxed, and the boxes were kept in storage areas awaiting the time when staff could review them. These files were themselves sometimes requested and were difficult to find because they were boxed and maintained only in a rudimentary queue. These files also received mail, further compounding the problems of getting the mail together with the file and getting both file and mail to the person responsible for acting on them.
The initial assistance from automation involved the simple recognition that computers are good places to keep lists. Even before the system change, for example, it was possible to develop a list of files that were charged to particular people. Once this list was computerized and available on all staff computers, it was easy to have each person charge a file in the system at the same time the file was physically transferred to somebody else. Thus anyone in the agency could immediately determine who had a particular file. File-room staff could now easily check to see if a file was charged out and to whom it was charged. When they needed to obtain a file, they could go armed with the file's location and when that file had been charged. Their message was simple: "I need a file that came to you last Friday." Because there was now a system that kept a list of where files were charged, it became very easy to create a similar list of files that were requested and link these two lists (now databases) together. Thus, all the files that were requested anywhere in the agency could be matched against files already charged, resulting in simple responses to a requester of either "the file is on its way" or "we cannot give you that file . . . it's already charged to somebody else."
For those files that were in the file room, the system provided an automatically updated report directed to a particular computer in the file room, where staff monitored the file requests. Priority codes were then assigned to these requests so that emergency requests received first attention and low-level, "routine" requests could be handled the 312 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE September 1999
following morning on a more efficient, batch basis. It was now also very easy to match the "diary" system against the charge system so that when a list came out ("you need to look at these files"), the current location of the file could be included. It was not very long before this system became powerful enough that people (particularly file-room staff) were checking the system before they did anything else. Thus, when a piece of mail came in, the first action was to look on the computer and see if the file was somewhere else. The residual category became "it's on the shelf where we can get at it." There is simplicity-elegance, even-in the resulting situation. These separate lists, it turned out, could be linked together. Not only did the system reflect that all files were located somewhere, but also a full chronology of their locations could be obtained on request. The list of files requested was a natural complement to this. Finally, the diaried files that were wanted by somebody at some time in the future could be added. That involved another straightforward list that could be cross-matched against the other two. These three related lists revealed the past, present, and future of a file's location. The changes thus progressed from being technical and instrumental into ones that restructured the meaning of information. The interlinking of these three lists created a unified understanding of the file. Because staff could know where a file had been, where it was, and where it would later be, they could deduce a great deal about it. For example, the system might indicate that a file was currently in a unit that did data entry and that it had come from a judicial officer; they could therefore infer that some award of benefits had been made (otherwise there would have been nothing for that unit to enter). Finally, they might note that the file was wanted in the future by a claims examiner and could therefore infer that these benefits needed to be reviewed at that time.
A crude computer inventory thus expanded to become a meaningful decision environment. For example, if I know that a file is coming to me in a week (because I decided 6 months ago it would be a good idea), I probably don't need to request it now to address some other routine issue that has come up. Or, if someone else is looking at this file in a month, I may be better off placing the information that I have (incoming mail, report of a phone conversation) in that file so that the other person can address all issues on the file in a month. Furthermore, my reliance on the physical file is greatly reduced because I can address many routine issues without it: for example, a phone inquiry from somebody involved in the case. Finally, the reuniting of the physical file with the proper person with the proper additional documentation is now no longer limited to the present. The person acting on the file, the file, and any additional material can now be targeted for reunion in the future.
The Effects of Change: Production, Public Contact, and Data-Processing Staff
As a result of this system change, people throughout the agency ended up with better information about files and an increased ability to obtain files when they wanted them. Staff in the file room itself reaped important benefits. Insofar as their problems in finding files and routing mail were reduced, their jobs were simpler and less disrupted by the need for frequent searches throughout the agency for lost files. They also were protected from false allegations of responsibility for lost files; the newly Haines / LETTING "THE SYSTEM" DO THE WORK 313 computerized lists provided an audit trail of where a file had been. Finally, some associated technical advances (especially bar coding) reduced the drudgery of repetitive keying.
The extensive computerization of the agency had positive results: The basic lists of file location, request, and future diary were independently developed, then linked, then elaborated as a multidimensional, multitemporal grid of a file's past, present, and future. The work of the file room was thus accomplished more effectively, staff were exposed to increasingly complex equipment (making possible an argument for increased salaries), and staff were better protected from the unsubstantiated allegations to which they had previously been subjected as the residual (because lowestranking) cause of any file-related problems. To assess the overall balance of these pros and cons, it is necessary to examine, again with particular reference to the file management example, the actual course of events in this particular agency and to do so separately for three distinct groups of people: those doing the actual management of files and mail (here called production staff), those doing the majority of file reviews and correspondence (here called public contact staff), and those with control over the data system (data-processing staff).
Production staff. The staff responsible for file and mail management were the major initial beneficiaries of the new system. Many of their more routine tasks were easily absorbed into computerized formats giving them the ability to inventory and circulate file materials far more efficiently. In this particular agency, they were able to have that increased effectiveness without any reduction in staffing levels. Yet, problems remained. Five years later, production staff were still the lowest graded staff in the agency and were even proportionately lower graded than they had been (because there had been significant staff upgrades elsewhere in the agency). File shelves were much less crowded but files continued to be misfiled and were occasionally still "lost." Mail was still often slow in moving to delivery points and was still sometimes misdirected.
What happened? Much of the problem reflected an alien technology that staff did not understand and were not trained to understand. The new technology sometimes cowed them and at times froze them out of basic decisions about the management of their work. There was also classic alienation from the work product. Files, for example, were formerly concrete, empirical objects that staff directly touched, moved, and controlled. Files now, however, had a dual existence, one existence in the traditional empirical world, the other in the new world of the computer. As they themselves started turning to "the system" for answers to questions, it became increasingly unclear which of the files was the shadow of the other. "The system says" became a familiar alternative to the actual physical location or contents of the file. Objective reality thus became contingent on "the system's" representation of that reality.
Thus, although the technology extended staff potential, that extension in some ways vitiated staff competence to handle their work. Staff were now dependent for an increasing part of their work on the technical (and unchallengeable) competence of data-processing staff. That is, the threefold promise of cost savings, autonomy, and flexibility was delivered by, through, and under the auspices and control of others. The computerization in itself expanded over broader sections of their work, initially 314 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE September 1999 relieving staff of drudgery but then reimposing a new routinization and minimalization of tasks. Production staff were, although not completely, stripped of their traditional competence by a new technology under someone else's control.
Public contact staff. The major consumers of the services of the file and mail management staff also benefited from the changes. However, the initial advantages for them were less extensive and less significant. Because these staff focused on follow-up with those involved in disputed claims, were paid more, and were considered to be more "professional," they already were spared many of the most routine tasks. They could fill out a file request slip or send a batch of mail back to the file room without having to worry about the mechanics of the process. They were not even responsible for the files that were already in their possession; they could have file-room staff search for files that might already be in their very own offices. The process did not need to be simpler for them, because it was-in its way-almost perfectly simple already.
In precisely this point lay one major danger of the system change. Instead of sending over to file staff a request for something, and thereby absolving themselves from any further responsibility, the system now encroached on the desks of these public contact staff and brought file information to them. Instead of file request slips, they had to punch in file numbers and priority codes; instead of pleading that they did not have a file and therefore could not file away a piece of mail, the system assured them that they did have that file and exactly when that file had been sent to them. The use of the system, then, had less immediate appeal and usability to these public contact staff. Indeed, the initial effect was probably more negative than positive. The system, by storing, collating, combining, and regurgitating information, was capable of bringing this new netherworld to their fingertips and making their responsibility fully auditable.
As computerization progressed, other organizational implications emerged. A new automated system, for example, was developed to track the most important mail coming to these information-consuming staff and how soon it was resolved or transferred for more formal judicial action. Although this system benefited public contact staff by providing a variety of more automated outgoing correspondence and file tracking, it also brought their specific activities out into the open. The benefits of automation left the public contact staff more dependent on other people's expertise, as well as leaving them open to a kind of workload monitoring from which they had previously been exempt. It was now possible, for example, to monitor the extent to which public contact staff did or did not actually follow-up on files that they had diaried for a certain date. For public contact staff, as for production staff, this new technology thus brought some significant dangers with its manifest promise. For public contact staff, the immediate benefits were less and the immediate dangers greater. For both, the widening web of an other-controlled, remorseless system led to at least some deterioration of both autonomy and flexibility.
Data-processing staff. Data-processing staff were the instigators and the most immediate beneficiaries of the in-house move. The freedom represented by the new PC-based system was, after all, most fundamentally their freedom from the external control of the state-controlled mainframe structure. However, the initial system setup Haines / LETTING "THE SYSTEM" DO THE WORK 315 was shaky enough to hold the danger of negative management reaction, and the pressure of responding to a multitude of implementation problems counterbalanced the joys of creation. With freedom came responsibility and the spotlight. One major problem for data-processing staff was that by controlling the technology, they were the only people who could service hardware and software problems.
1 Their very clear control over the system obliged the data-processing staff to respond to a variety of requests, many of them exceedingly routine. In cases in which people could manage to exert sufficient influence, the data-processing department became a sort of service company to solve any problems that could be even remotely linked to the computer environment. Because other staff were alienated from the technology, they had to turn to dataprocessing staff to do tasks for them that were exceedingly routine but now were lodged within this computer environment. Thus, data-processing staff-the creators and controllers of the entire system-were also subordinated to the system and to the competing demands of its users. These demands were, predictably, more widespread, time-consuming, and even petty (e.g., resolving video problems for games played on computers taken home) when they came from higher levels of the organization.
Not only were data-processing staff on call for every possible system-related defect, but they became convenient scapegoats for problems that occurred. As data became more and more easily available, mistakes that occurred in data entry were more visible. Furthermore, because there were occasional data losses, incorrect data entry, or faulty data transfers/conversions, system errors could be absorbed into the general repertoire of excuses. The system could be blamed for not being able to do certain things, for making mistakes, for losing information, or for displaying information in misleading ways. The burdens of the creators were thus far from inconsequential. In creating the system, the data-processing staff necessarily became responsible for it and, like production and public contact staff, became its victims as well as its beneficiaries. Solace lay in the honor of creation, however, the better salaries that went along with that, and a freedom of action resulting from the virtual unknowability of their work.
Empowerment and Vitiation: Knowledge, Productivity, and Skills
The implementation in this particular agency of a new computer system led to initial benefits for all the major groups of people involved and for the organization as a whole. However, all the people involved were in some way or another, to a greater or lesser extent, vitiated by the process as well. Although the effects varied, for all groups implementation of the new system at some point in the cycle brought renewed drudgery and alienation of control. Thus, staff were to some extent empowered and to some extent vitiated. Rather than assessing the net result of these processes, it is important to look at the internal structure of empowerment and of vitiation in both technological and social terms. This is the key issue through which the merging of these two domains can be seen-and, one would hope, improved.
On technological grounds, staff-particularly production staff-were empowered in three distinct ways: they had increased their direct knowledge of agency activities, 316 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE September 1999 their work was enhanced in terms of volume and speed, and their skills were enhanced. Simply put, they became more knowledgeable, more productive, and more skilled. These dimensions of empowerment came directly from the technological changes because in this case, management was concurrently promoting staff development. But each of these dimensions of empowerment faced countervailing forces-forces that grew from built-in technical limitations, management limitations, and issues of social control and hierarchy.
Knowledge. Perhaps most important, the computerization described here opened up vast realms of information. Building on the previous limited information available on basic disability case characteristics, within a period of 3 years, staff had access to the complete history of a case, including integrated systems for tracking file actions (opened, closed), payments on a case (at what amount for what periods), and the resolution of any disputes on the case (when the file was referred, to whom, with what final action). One essential piece of information was simply where the file was and how long it had been there. Although inventory and file-tracking computer applications were well established in the private sector at that time (e.g., for manufacturing and for tracing of private mail delivery companies), this was a major change in this particular agency. Not only was there more information available, but it was available more rapidly and to more people. Everyone now had access to basic file information and, without recourse to the physical file or to any special knowledge of other staff, could answer a variety of questions for their own sake and in response to outside inquiries.
Such a breadth of opening to shared knowledge can have unforeseen implications. Independent access to facts-to the "truth" of day-to-day events-provides an important weapon in equalizing the power differentials among people. In one case, for example, the agency head found there had been delay in the handling of some files. As a perfect expression of the organization's established hierarchy, he accused staff in the file room of causing the delay. The accusation was phrased in a decidedly nasty manner and included a statement that these staff would need additional training to correct their errors. But things had changed. File management staff, with the assistance of data-processing staff, were able to reconstruct from computer records where the files had actually been while they were delayed. The evidence was conclusive that the delay had been caused by higher graded paralegal staff. The agency head was forced to tender a formal apology. No longer could an accusation of incompetence be based solely on who had the least organizational power to object to such an accusation; now there were "facts" that, being equally available to all, could neutralize the power inherent in the agency's sharply hierarchical structure.
Although the empowerment provided by this sharp increase in information is clear, so are the limitations. One is that of social control and hierarchy. When people in an organization can no longer rely on the social hierarchy to determine the veracity of people's statements, they either must readjust their views of that hierarchy (which usually has class or professional underpinnings); reinstate the hierarchy on new, firmer foundations; or simply disavow the meaning of much of the new information. In this particular agency, disavowal was the core response. One major reason for that was a common one with technological innovation: Management rarely has either the desire to seize the opportunities for new organizational structures or the technical competence to absorb and control new flows of information.
Productivity. Agency productivity was enhanced by the technological changes. The major production department experienced measurable performance increases of 15% to 20% over the period in question. The ability to find and route files was sharply enhanced. Workload counts showed a sharp decrease in the number of files that could not be located and the amount of time staff spent roaming the agency checking individual offices for files also decreased. A serious backlog of processing in another area was almost instantaneously resolved by setting up a computerized series of letters that were produced and mailed without any action on the part of staff. Dissemination of information to the public was a key "product" of the agency, and there the increased amount of computer-based information also provided sharp productivity increases, particularly in the ability to resolve many public inquiries on the spot. In yet other areas, the increased productivity had less to do with measurable numbers than with a general increase in ease of work: Computer programs for benefit calculations, for example, saved several steps in responding to public inquiries and probably were more accurate as well.
At the most basic level, increased productivity to some degree "empowers" labor because the options for actively managing and completing work are improved. In this agency, there was no decrease in staffing, so there was no immediate offset to this empowerment-the efficiency increase was not matched with the frequent punishment of reduced resources. Rather, the increased productivity was used to subsidize some improvements in the quality of the work. Nevertheless, the improvements had some negative consequences. Most important, with better information, it became possible to estimate a quantitative standard for productivity. Those lower in the organization with more routine tasks were most easily subjected to such standards. The danger to labor lay in the removal of much of the mystique and ambiguity from work. Productivity was indeed improved, but it also was more out in the open and more measurable. Skills. Much of the discussion of labor and technological change has been phrased in terms of a decrease in worker skills (Baba, 1991; Braverman, 1974; Orr, 1991) . However, there is also a considerable increase in skills that goes along with technological change. In this agency, especially for production staff, the effects were significant. The exposure to automation was, in itself, important. All staff were given computers and taught the essentials for using them. The focus was on database access and updating. However, there was also a reasonable amount of word processing (letters and form letters), some introduction to operating systems (especially using batch files in DOS), more ad hoc database querying (on stand-alone databases for particular unit projects), and, eventually, introduction to imaging technology. There also was considerable advance in more generic skills: basic principles of business correspondence, setting standards for database entry, and even hardware troubleshooting. At the same time, staff received their first training in overall agency operations and consolidated their policies into formal procedure manuals (which provided another defense against the capriciousness of upper management). In at least some cases, as well, there was an increase in the ability to deal with systems as a whole-something Baba (1991) has noted as a distinct new skill area in its own right.
Nevertheless, there was some pressure toward reduced skill levels. Three examples may suffice. First, one unit was responsible for the calculation of benefits due. This had traditionally involved complex calculations by calculator. With the new system, such calculational experience was rarely needed. Thus, the very element that had been used (with some success) to argue for higher grade levels was effectively removed from the job. Second, there was a frequent deterioration in the quality and accuracy of production work. As such work increasingly was generated by the system in a massive daily production run, staff became less attentive to the documents. Typographical mistakes on production letters, for example, sometimes endured for months (even years in a few cases) before somebody noticed them. Third, there was a general alienation from the physical file and the ability to review it for the overall history of a case. Instead, staff relied on the synopsis of the case that existed in the databases, failing often to reconcile the "discrepancies between automated representations of reality and actual production processes" (Baba, 1991, p. 9) .
DISCUSSION
Although the descriptive delineation of this joint progression of empowerment and vitiation in one particular agency has been the central purpose of this article, three concluding points may serve to extrapolate from this case material toward a broader analysis of the nature and revelations of computerization as a social process.
First, for all the groups involved, the changes meant a greater visibility of workload and work quality. Information was increasingly available both to people and about people. (Indeed, one senior manager made several attempts to crack the code for reading employee e-mail.) The effects varied sharply among the different groups because the initial access to information, and visibility of one's own information to others, reflected the existing structure of social differentiation within the organization. The implementation of a new system had the potential for a dangerous equalization of previously discrepant statuses. The availability of information, for example, initially served to protect the production staff (whose work always was questioned because of their low status) and to make public contact staff vulnerable to questions about their work. As is widely noted, it is in such tampering with hierarchy, as much as in the strictly technology area, that open database systems can be truly revolutionary. It is not simply, however, that the resulting transparency of work processes necessarily served one set of people-that it was tantamount to the Benthamite panopticon that Foucault (1978) resurrects as he considers how surveillance serves power.
3 Rather, such transparency represents a distinctly different kind of regime that is not-at least initially-organizationally or even hierarchically directed.
Second, these changes were accompanied by both empowerment and vitiation. There is always the real danger in this kind of change of reducing labor to a lower Haines / LETTING "THE SYSTEM" DO THE WORK 319 skilled, less committed, and less effective force. This is likely to be a particular danger if technological change is not matched with aggressive staff development. With a balanced approach toward staff development and technological advance-toward jointly increasing human capacity and machine capacity-the result is likely to be less bleak and may even result in sharply improved knowledge, productivity, and skills. In this agency, despite direct managerial concern with such staff development, there indeed were two negative trends: a relative increase in the hierarchical range of salary "grades" and a serious increase in staff turnover among production staff. However, it is neither possible to trace such problems solely to computerization change nor to presume the extent or direction of such changes, given the flux introduced into organizations by sharp technological shifts.
Third, the lack of ambiguity in computer systems presents a difficult organizational challenge. As staff drift away from their own autonomous standards and traditions of operation, the basic meaning to them of work processes may evaporate. Production and public contact staff had forged traditional interactional and interfactional patterns that subsumed, covered, and provided functional equivalents to precise structuring of work processes and definitions of work inputs and products. Computerization requires precise operational definitions and flows, depends on staff who are generally external to such flows, and reveals errors and discrepancies in glaring ways. It thus requires exactly the kind of flexibility and aggressively proactive management that is likely to be missing as the process of technological change rearranges relationships and threatens existing categories of privilege. There is some irony in seeing the formal organization, which often has been construed as the vehicle of a rationalistic modernity, as itself the "iron cage" from which a flexible "modernizing" technological change undertakes to escape (Ray & Reed, 1994) .
The case on whether such technological change in itself vitiates as it empowers, or simply unleashes social forces that undercut that empowerment, thus remains inconclusive-and appropriately so because the issue is not one of a summary generalization about "the organization" or "the change" as clear, unproblematic phenomena. The issue is rather the way in which technological change and social processes intersect and help construct each other as specific points within an overall process of technological change. Nevertheless, this case does suggest how strongly computerization works to objectify work processes. Indeed, it can be argued that computerization dissolves ambiguity in three distinct ways: by forcing a rationalizing of work processes (which is a prerequisite to successful automation), by transforming that rationalization into "facts" stored in a structured database environment, and, finally, by making it possible-and quite easy-to disseminate those facts to anyone in the organization. Talk about work, which may range from the construction of the social meaning of work, to narrative accounts that diagnose organizational problems, to the outright fabrication of lies in support of personal gain, now has a far stronger objective counterweight in data that are structured to correspond to the specific items and ordering of work processes-and have been proved by their very implementation to be "accurate." This is not just a situation of automating or even of "informating," because the result is both procedural gain and the creation of information that is uniquely structured, distilled, transportable, and proved through test to be accurate for what it represents.
